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Forord 
Denne masteroppgaven er et resultat av ti deler lesing, fire deler kildekontroll, åtte deler 
skriving, tre deler hastverk, to deler uro og seks deler nysgjerrighet. I tillegg kommer drøyt 
tredve liter kaffe.  
Deadlinespøkelset har besøkt meg titt og ofte gjennom denne seansen. Jeg ønsker å rette en 
takk til veileder, Magnus Petersson for tålmodighet, gode råd og Zen. En takk også til 
hjemmelaget mitt; Therese, Anders, Sunniva, Sigurd og Ole.  
Temaet for denne oppgaven var noe jeg fattet interesse for under utdanningen, både fordi jeg 
ser på det som relevant og fordi jeg oppfattet det som et relativt uutforsket område som stadig 
er under utvikling. Dessverre er temaet er så altfor stort for en enkelt masteroppgave og det 
krever mer plass og tid enn et masterstudium kan gi. I lønnlig håp om at oppgaven kan gjøre 
nytte for seg utover det lille miljøet i Norge, er oppgaven skrevet på engelsk. 
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Sammendrag 
Cyberområdet har gitt verden nye muligheter for kommunikasjon, kontroll og produktivitet. 
Det har effektivisert samfunnet og innvirker på alt fra forsvar, regjering, forskning og finans 
til helse, industri, energi og forsyning. Selv privatlivet har endret seg og vil fortsette å endres 
som følge av et inntog av strømmetjenester, IoT , sosiale medier, bloggere og influencere.  
Cyberområdet har også bragt med seg noen nisser på lasset. Trojanere gjenoppstår i form av 
ondsinnede dataprogrammer. Dagens troll sprer sine løgner uinnskrenket gjennom sosiale 
nettverk og svakheter i datasystemene har gitt angriperne på vestlig demokrati nye 
innfallsvinkler.   
Det er tre hovedtrusler som truer samfunnet gjennom cyberspace; spionasje, sabotasje og 
undergravende virksomhet. Denne oppgaven forsøker å vise at for å kunne redusere trusselen 
fra angrep i cyberspace, må dette søkes løst gjennom internasjonale avtaler, nasjonale poitiske 
veivalg, et integrert cyberforsvar både på nasjonalt og internasjonalt plan og gjennom 
avskrekking. 
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Abstract 
Cyberspace has given the world unprecedented opportunities for communication, control and 
productivity. It has transformed and rationalized every public and private sector from 
government, defense, health and science to finance, industry, transport and production. 
Even the private sphere has been influenced as a result of connected appliances, streaming 
and social media, bloggers and influencers. 
Nonetheless, cyberspace has brought out some more sinister phenomena. Trojan horses have 
resurrected as malware and troll factories now spread their lies unhindered through social 
media. The enemies of Western democracy have gained a new vector of attack. 
There are three main threats to society that have gained new access to society through 
cyberspace; espionage, sabotage and subversion.   
This thesis intends to show that the endeavour to reduce the threat of attacks in cyberspace 
must be sought through international agreements, national policy, a concerted national and 
international cybersecurity and deterrence. 
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1.Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Cyberspace has revolutionized the way we interact. From a humble start, it has changed the 
way we control our machines to the way we communicate with each other. Critical 
infrastructure, ranging from transportation, energy, food and water supply to healthcare, 
finance, government and military systems have been and are becoming more and more 
connected, giving unprecedented opportunities for situation awareness and accuracy. 
Created within the sphere of Western liberalism, the Internet was made free for all. 
Unregulated, without any form of censorship or control, it has allowed a boundless sharing of 
information and opinion. This freedom and the ever- increasing speed of interchange has 
impacted political life, creating new ways for politicians to reach the electorate, while at the 
same time giving the electorate a voice in return. In business life, every industry and 
marketplace have been challenged and changed. It has affected our personal lives, altering the 
way we receive information, shop our groceries and clothes to the way we consume 
entertainment and communicate with each other.   
Cyberspace has not come without a host of problems. Hacktivism, viruses, Trojans, DDoS, 
phishing and ransomware have all become household names. Former director of the CIA, 
Leon Panetta, urged the strengthening of cyber security measures, saying that cyberspace 
“could also be “the battlefield of the future”.(Ravindranath, 2014) Warnings are rife about 
how attacks in cyberspace can turn a state’s weapons impotent, its military command and 
control systems useless, shatter the civilian social fabric and leave a country’s industry and 
infrastructure in tatters.   
There are methods to protect against these attacks, but evidence show that they do not stop 
them from reappearing in new guises. This effectively constitutes a state of continual weapons 
race between the attacker and the defender.  
The sovereignty and autonomy of a state are under pressure not only from direct cyber-attacks 
to government bodies. Private companies of vital national value have equally become 
attainable targets. These companies have to fend for themselves against cyber-attacks, a task 
they are unequal to perform. They are not capable to withstand hostile campaigns from 
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Advanced Persistent Threats1 (APT). Erosion has also been caused by internationalization, 
where cloud computing and multinational companies slip away from a state’s jurisdiction.  
In order to understand how a state best can organize its collected efforts to create resilience 
and safeguard its sovereignty and its way of life, it is not sufficient to look only at the 
domestic scene. It is also necessary to look beyond the national borders to investigate what 
legislation, cooperation and vehicles of defense and deterrence that can reduce the hazards of 
cyberspace and defend a state’s sovereignty.  
1.2. Scope and research questions 
Historically, deterrence has been used to safeguard a nation against hostile attacks, raising the 
bar for an attacker. Both defensive and offensive measures are tools used to deter an enemy. 
The essence of deterrence is to induce an aggressor to believe that the cost and the risk of an 
attack will too high and that the returns will be too low. 
In cyberspace, the expenditure and resources necessary to carry out an attack are low, 
compared to kinetic attacks. The risk of retaliation has so far been negligible cyberspace and 
the benefits to be gained from of a cyberattack have been potentially large. If the reward of an 
attack is neither cost, resources or risk can dissuade an attacker, what opportunities are there 
for deterrence? 
So far, there have been no cases where cyberattacks have escalated into war.  
The goal of this thesis is to find out to what extent cyberattacks can be deterred. This will be 
done by examining various offensive and defensive measures and assessing their effectiveness 
as deterrent vehicles. The thesis will endeavour to answer the following questions: 
 What are cyber-attacks and how do they threaten a state? 
 How does deterrence of cyberattacks differ from deterrence of armed attacks? 
 What vehicles of deterrence are relevant to employ against cyberattacks and what are 
their inherent strengths and weaknesses?  
                                                 
1 Advanced Persistant Threat is the designation of hacker organizations that use continuous, clandestine, and 
sophisticated hacking techniques to gain access to a system and remain inside for a prolonged period of time, 
with potentially destructive consequences. APTs are generally seen as government- controlled.(Andress & 
Winterfeld, 2013) 
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1.3. Limitations 
Volumes have been written about the threats in cyberspace and of deterrence in general.  
In the endeavour to write a Master thesis on the deterrence of cyber-attacks, it is impossible to 
treat all sides of the subject in equal detail. The following limitations have been necessary to 
focus on the most important aspects of this subject.  
 The thesis will be limited to studying deterrence in the perspective of state sovereignty, 
focusing on Western democracies. Although the threats and vulnerabilities will be similar to 
all states, it is only Western democracies that are sufficiently open to divulge information on 
cyber-attacks. Another reason for this limitation is that when it comes to offensive measures, 
it is only the great powers that possess the necessary conventional and nuclear forces to 
escalate a conflict beyond certain levels. Among the Western democracies, we find the USA, 
Great Britain and France who all have a nuclear capability. In addition, NATO extends this 
ability to most of the other democracies. This limitation allows the thesis to explore strategies 
that are limited to them and unavailable to small or failed states.  
The theories on deterrence are to a large degree influenced by the nuclear era. In the face of 
nuclear weapons, deterrence by denial was futile. As a result, deterrence theory was in general 
preoccupied with punishment. This left the field of scholarly debate on deterrence by denial 
relatively sterile. In the thesis, this is reflected by the shortness of the theoretical basis for 
denial, but denial is discussed in more detail in relation to cyberattacks, where defensive 
measures may prove less hopeless. International Relations (IR) theories have a bearing on the 
political side of cyber conflicts. Nevertheless, the scope of the thesis is the deterrence of 
cyber-attacks. It is not concerned with the reasons to why states resort to launch hostile 
operations in cyberspace. The thesis will not provide a thorough presentation or of IR 
theories.  
Hostile actors proliferate in cyberspace. Many of them are criminals or political activists, but 
cybercrime and political activism will not be the scope of this thesis. They may be a threat to 
civilian life and can be used by Advanced Persistant Threats (APT) to blur the origin of an 
attack. Although private hackers, activist groups or criminals may aspire to threaten a state, 
they will not be discussed unless they pose a threat to the sovereignty of a state.  
Cyber-attacks come in many guises, but for a state-actor, they can serve as instruments to 
reduce an adversary state’s power and freedom of action. They manifest themselves in three 
main categories: espionage, sabotage and subversion. Although espionage can seriously 
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reduce a state’s edge in technology by stealing vital information2, espionage cannot be 
defined as an act of war and it cannot be deterred. It will not be discussed in any detail in this 
thesis.  
1.4. Disposition 
The thesis will try to explain why this is the case by examining the nature of cyberattacks, 
their effects, how they are used and investigate why states have not been induced to declare 
war. This thesis is structured in the following way: 
The research methodology and analytical framework is first presented, followed by an 
appreciation of the sources used in the thesis.  
To set the context of the thesis, a general overview is presented to show how society has 
grown vulnerable by the incorporation of cyberspace.  
This is followed by a description of four well-known cyberattacks. The four examples of 
attacks are chosen because they represent four main vectors of attacks. Three of these attacks, 
the Stuxnet, “Operation Orchard”, and the Russian attack on the U.S. Presidential election 
were carried out with the intent and capability of damaging a state or reducing its influence, 
whilst the fourth shows how vital national interests can be attacked through the private sector.  
 The Stuxnet attack on the Natanz nuclear facility. The case illustrates how cyberspace 
can be used to attack a national strategic capacity. It is also an example of how an 
attack can be tailored to a target. 
 “Operation Orchard”. The case of the Israeli attack on Syria in 2007, shows how cyber 
weapons can be used in war to gain tactical advantage.  
 The Russian interference in the U.S. presidential election gives an example of how the 
fabric of society can be influenced and subverted through cyberspace. 
 The “Lockergoga”- attack on Norsk Hydro in March 2019, although its origin is as yet 
undisclosed, serves as an example of how an attack on an important industry company 
                                                 
2  In 2014, Su Bin, a Chinese national was arrested in Canada. Extradited to the USA, he was charged 
with the theft of “military technical data, including data relating to the C-17 strategic transport 
aircraft and certain fighter jets produced for the U.S. military.” 
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can disrupt vital national interests. It also highlights the challenges to national strategy 
when the attacked company is multinational. 
These attacks illustrate what types of threats that exist in cyberspace, how cyber weapons 
function and the ways they can be employed in international conflicts. They also exemplify 
how the emergence of cyberspace has created new vulnerabilities to a state and what obstacles 
may hinder response to such attacks.  
Deterrence theory is next presented with a short introduction of the strategies used during the 
Cold War, which spurred the academic discussion on deterrence. 
Outlining the measures that are or can be employed to counter a cyber threat, the fourth part 
of the thesis will consider the opportunities and constraints of cyber deterrence by discussing 
the strengths and weaknesses of offensive and defensive deterrent measures. This will include 
an appreciation of the use of International Law and its relevance to cyberspace. 
 
In conclusion, the thesis will discuss to what extent cyberattacks can be deterred and suggest 
what measures that are most likely to reduce the threat of hostile behaviour in cyberspace.  
1.5. Research methodology 
The goal of this thesis is to advance the understanding of how cyberattacks can be deterred. In 
order to do so, it is necessary to answer the three research questions of the thesis. The first 
question is what a cyber-attack is and how it threatens a state. This necessitates a reduction of 
the myriad of different types of malware and attack methods into a few main categories. Four 
examples of cyberattacks are presented. Each of these attacks illustrates a specific threat, 
attack vector and target. This will explain how cyberattacks function, what vulnerabilities 
they exploit and what kind of damage they are capable of doing. 
The second research question is posed in order to explore how deterrence of cyberattacks 
differs from deterrence of armed attacks. To do so, the theory of deterrence must be 
consulted. Its validity in cyberspace is shown in relation to the examples of cyberattacks 
presented with research question number one. This question is also explored further under the 
third research question.  
The third research question queries what vehicles of deterrence are relevant to employ against 
cyberattacks and what their inherent strengths and weaknesses are. To answer this, the 
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vehicles are examined under the headings of offensive and defensive measures. In the 
conclusion, the thesis argues that the deterrence of cyberattacks is a multifaceted endeavour, 
where both defensive and offensive measures are vital.  
This thesis uses the qualitative method. This method is chosen because the thesis is mainly 
based on literary studies. The bulk of the literary sources are academic works, which gives 
validity to the thesis. On the other hand, literary sources raise some challenges as to the 
reliability of these sources. As pointed to under 1.3 Limitations, incidents in cyberspace do 
not age well, and that may also be the case of articles connected to them. Incidents that seem 
serious or important when they occur may turn out to be trivial when looked at from a 
distance. There is also the bias of interpretation. The analysis of an incident against a 
backdrop of several similar incidents may give a different interpretation than if the incident is 
unprecedented. To reduce the bias of interpretation, the case of the Stuxnet attack and the case 
of the Russian interference in the 2016 election examples have been chosen, both because 
they exemplify how cyber-attacks can be used against a state, and because they are well 
documented in several academic sources. That these sources are academic also increases their 
reliability when they show that there is a general consensus on the specific case.   
The two other cases are less well documented. 
For the case of “Operation Orchard”, there are few academic sources apart from the book 
“Cyber war will not take place” (Rid, 2013). This case has been chosen because it is one of 
very few cases where a cyberattack is documented to have played a part in armed conflict. 
Since there is very little information available to describe how the attack was carried out, the 
focus in this case is on what cyber-attacks can achieve in conjunction with physical attacks. 
The Hydro case is new. The attack was announced in a press release on March 19th, 2019 
(Hydro, 2019a) and investigation and forensic work is still ongoing. No scholarly work has 
been produced on the incident, and the security companies that cooperate with Hydro are 
reticent. This case has been included because it illustrates important issues in the deterrence of 
cyber-attacks. First, it is an example of how a state can be targeted through the private sector. 
Second, Lockergoga, the malware that was used in the attack is a new breed of ransomware 
that  
Another problem with reliability arise when government documents are consulted. Since 
defence, security and deterrence are of vital interest to states, there are few unclassified 
documents that convey anything but general views. There is also a challenge that many of 
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these documents are written for the public. The goal of these documents may serve other 
purposes than telling the truth. To reduce this bias, the documents have been scrutinized and 
correlated to theory and other sources. 
1.6. Sources 
The thesis relies mainly on literary sources, where the goal is to produce a nuanced analysis of 
the problems that a state faces from cyber-attacks, how these threats can be countered and the 
strengths and weaknesses of the deterrent measures.   
The thesis uses scientific articles and scholarly sources to form the basis on deterrence theory. 
It must be noted that deterrence theory is a topic that has not been in vogue since the Cold 
War ended. As a result of this, most of the sources on deterrence antedate the appearance of 
cyberspace and are in general preoccupied with nuclear deterrence. 
 Cyberspace is relatively new and is in constant flux. This creates a problem with what cases 
that should be examined. Not all cyber-attacks are relevant to the discussion of deterrence. 
Due to the development of cyberspace, new programs and security flaws constantly appear. 
As a result of this, several cyberattacks that have received much academic attention are dated. 
The reason for this is that they were generally unsophisticated. Most of them involved no 
more than the defacing of web pages, spamming mail servers and congesting servers by 
DDOS- attacks. Although the novelty of these attack made headlines and caught the attention 
of scholars and laymen alike, they did little harm and little to threaten the sovereignty of a 
state. This makes the use of early attacks as examples problematic. New attacks may be far 
more sinister, but pose another problem in that there may not yet exist any scholarly debate or 
official documents about them. In such cases, newspaper articles, more or less informed, and 
security firm and government web pages, more or less candid, may be the only sources 
available. In these cases, caution in relation to reliability is maintained and sought improved 
by using several different sources. 
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2.The vulnerability of modern society  
Prior to the introduction of cyberspace, sectors of vital national interest like energy, transport, 
health, finances, defense or government were difficult to manipulate by an adversary. 
Espionage entailed high personal risk and the control systems within the different sectors 
could not be manipulated except through physical intrusion and sabotage or by armed attacks. 
The defense of these systems were taken care of in two main ways: situation awareness and 
control. To some degree, imminent attacks or sabotage could be predicted by the international 
situation, through diplomacy and by the intelligence services. The outer perimeter of the state 
would be safeguarded by the armed services, whereas the police force would be responsible 
for upholding law and order and sustaining the cohesion of civilian life until higher levels of 
insecurity would require more resources from the armed forces like the Home Guard. 
Sabotage would trigger tighter defence of vulnerable, high-value targets vital to the state, 
giving resilience to society, as it would slowly be turned to a war footing. There was little 
opportunity for subversive action since the media was edited and run by national news houses 
or were state-controlled. In this situation, peacetime required little need for constant vigilance 
in most sectors. 
Cyberattacks have changed this. Cyber weapons may be planted or launched in peacetime and 
have the capacity to disrupt communication, put entire sectors out of operation. Attacks in 
cyberspace can be performed with unprecedented speed, giving little warning and no time for 
countermeasures.  
The military services were early adopters of digitization, but the efficiency of digital 
command and control systems has been leveraged across all industries, trade, transportation, 
government and finance. Cyberspace was built within the sphere of liberalism. It has no 
national boundaries and open communication, transparency, trust, rule- of-law and fair play 
have been taken for granted.  
Digital products, the Internet and social media platforms were all built without any 
consideration that these liberties could be threatened. In this environment, national companies 
have been allowed to evolve unhindered into multinational companies, where little else than 
taxation is precariously kept under national jurisdiction.  
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Email and the Internet have been disruptive in the way information can be despatched and 
shared. This was seen as strengthening democracy and may have turned out to be instrumental 
in the popular risings in the Middle East.  
At the same time, the introduction of E-mail and the Internet boosted the vulnerability of 
civilian society, as a host of viruses and worms could now be sown through emails and web 
browsers. The advent of social media platforms has opened up new opportunities for 
subversive actions, ushering in social engineering and information campaigns. 
At the dawn of the Internet of Things (IoT), modern society has become, and continually 
grows more vulnerable to attacks in cyberspace. Because the diversity of components, 
systems and services in cyberspace have been modelled and configured to function in a 
hostile-free environment, it is the inherent lack of integral security of the targeted systems, or 
the victim’s lack of routines and vigilance that is the direct cause of the vulnerabilities in 
modern society. 
 It is inevitable that a new low-risk vector for attack has been created when computers and 
automated processes assisting or replacing manpower, are connected to the Internet. 
2.1. Cyber weapons 
Basically, all cyber weapons function in the same way.  
A target system is scanned for possible entry. If this is found, the system is infiltrated and by 
exploiting vulnerabilities basically, the payload of the attack is delivered.  
Rid and McBurney have submitted a definition to what cyber weapons are. This distinguishes 
cyber weapons from crime and espionage:  “computer code that is used, or designed to be 
used, with the aim of threatening or causing physical, functional, or mental harm to 
structures, systems, or living beings”(Rid & McBurney, 2012). 
In order to fully grasp the threat of cyberattacks, it is necessary to understand that the toolbox 
of attackers is large, and that the tools are widely available. Proliferation of these tools is 
difficult to restrict. The leaked hacking tools from the NSA, auctioned off by “the Shadow 
Brokers” is an example of how both state-based hackers and private hackers can get hold of 
state-of-the-art software (Price, 2016). As a result of this, the ability to launch sophisticated 
attacks is not restricted to state-based hackers. 
Once a system is infiltrated, there are three main actions that can be performed: espionage, 
sabotage or subversion. These actions need not take place at once. A backdoor can be created, 
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giving the attacker the opportunity to control the attack remotely and commence an attack at a 
favourable moment. Whether the attack is carried out with a computer virus in order to steal 
information, destroy or interrupt a system through malware or using social media as an 
instrument to manipulate public opinion, it is the inherent vulnerability of the targeted system, 
or the victim’s lack of vigilance that is the direct reason for the fall. There must be a weak 
link that can be exploited.  
The Norwegian intelligence service issues a yearly report describing the threats to Norway. In 
the issue for 2019, China and Russia pose the largest threats. Their cyber operations have 
become more coordinated and effective than before. Targeted objects span from political 
institutions, military systems to research institutions and private high-tech companies. 
Russia’s cyber operations have been aimed to undermine political processes and increase 
polarization within Europe and NATO through the use of false news, social media and 
influencing elections.(Etterretningstjenesten, 2019b) 
2.2. Hackers, hacktivists and APTs 
Most attacks in cyberspace are motivated by economical gain and are classified and 
prosecuted as crime. Cyberattacks can also be carried out with a political motive. When they 
are carried out by private persons or organizations, they are classified as “hactivism”. States 
also use cyberspace as a political tool. State hackers are known as advanced persistant threats 
(APTs).3 See Appendix A for a list of known APTs and their origin. 
Attacks in cyberspace are common. The vast majority of infiltration attempts come through 
the mail system. A classic way to gain access is by including a program disguised as an 
attachment to an email, inducing the recipient to open it. Opening the attachment, the 
recipient unwittingly launches the program, which manipulates the system leaving it open for 
infiltration and exploitation. In 2017, F-secure stated in their report “state of cyber security” 
that 60 % of what they understood to be “active reconnaissance traffic” came from Russian 
IP addresses. Half of this traffic was searching for unprotected http/https ports.   
Attackers probe these ports in an attempt to look for vulnerable software that can be exploited in order 
to upload malware or otherwise compromise the device” “attackers can compromise a machine (such as 
by infecting a computer with malware) and then use it to conduct scans looking for additional targets 
“Worms, bots, and other types of malware programmed to automatically begin scanning for new targets 
after infecting a particular device are often spread in this fashion (F-Secure, 2017, p. 17). 
                                                 
3 See appendix A for a list of known APTs with names, origin and known attacks.  
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Although the characteristics of cybercrime and hacktivism may use the same tools and share 
many of the characteristics of government-backed attacks, they do not have the same 
opportunities of insidious turmoil and sabotage. A state can protect its hackers and give them 
immunity from prosecution. Another difference between them is the economic power. A state 
far outstrips criminal and activist organizations in its ability to provide its hacker organization 
with funds, time, organization, manpower and resources. An example of this is can be seen in 
Appendix B. The appendix lists the known attacks attributed to APT 28 (GRU4) between 
2015 and 2018. It is indicative of the variety of targets, methods, scope and capacity of a 
state- governed hacker network. This means that the cyber-attacks launched by a state on 
another state or its vital sectors are potentially more sinister than anything that a private 
hacker will be able to produce. This does not imply that private hackers can be dismissed. On 
There are situations when a private hacker might choose to launch an attack when a state 
would hesitate to do so. 
For a state, the threshold for committing serious digital sabotage in peacetime is high, due to 
the fact that such operations can be interpreted as acts of war. Nevertheless, the way from 
capacity to actual use has been shortened (Etterretningstjenesten, 2019a). 
  
                                                 
4 GRU is the foreign military intelligence agency of the Russian General Staff. 
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3.Attacks in Cyberspace 
In this chapter, four types of attacks relevant to a state are presented. The examples illustrate 
how such attacks can be used, how they function, what targets they may strike, and the 
vulnerabilities they may exploit. 
 
3.1. Stuxnet - attacking the system 
Stuxnet is the best- known attack on a computer system and is an example of how an attack 
can be tailored to strike at a particular target.  
In 2010, Iran experienced a rise in the malfunction of the centrifuges at its uranium 
enrichment plant in Natanz. Normally, it replaced up to 10 percent of its centrifuges a year, 
which amounted to about 800. Over a course of a few months, this had increased to between 
1000 and 2000 centrifuges breaking down.  
The Stuxnet worm was discovered, when the Belorussian computer security firm 
VirusBlokAda became aware of a computer in Iran caught in a reboot loop. The firm found 
out, that the virus had been launched in June 2009 and that it used a “zero-day” exploit in 
Windows Explorer to spread through infected USB sticks from one computer to another.  
One of the driver files had used a valid signed certificate stole from RealTek Semiconductor, 
a hardware maker in Taiwan to pass as a trusted program from that company.  Another driver 
file had a stolen certificate from JMicron Technology, which happened to be located in the 
same business park as RealTek. ESET, a security firm, wrote that such professional 
operations were rarely seen, testifying that the attackers had significant resources.(Zetter, 
2011) 
Stuxnet is a piece of malware, which was written expressly for targeting industrial systems, 
while using personal computers as an attack vector. Industrial systems are operated and 
controlled by specialized computers called Programmable Logic controllers (PLCs) in a three-
tiered Industry Control System (ICS). In this system, the lowest tier consist of field devices, 
like engines valves etc. These are controlled by the second tier. The second tier consists of 
PLCs. They in their turn are directed by the third and topmost tier, called the Supervisory 
Control And Data Acquisition/ Human Machine Interface (SCADA/HMI)(De Falco, 2012).  
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The SCADA and PLCs at the Natanz enrichment plant, their architecture and programs were 
all delivered by Siemens.   
The Stuxnet computer worm was aimed at the Siemens SCADA –programs. Infiltrating 
Microsoft Windows, the worm used a root kit to conceal the content of the malware. Next, the 
worm specifically sought out and compromised the Siemens Step 7 SCADA software, which 
controlled the PLCs.  
Making sure that the Central Processing Unit (CPU) of the PLC were either type 6ES7-315-2 
or 6ES7-417, it would check which types of field units that the PLC controlled.(De Falco, 
2012) 
Symantec has given further evidence to the sophistication of the Stuxnet: 
 Stuxnet requires particular frequency converter drives from specific vendors, some of which may not be 
procurable in certain countries. 
 Stuxnet requires the frequency converter drives to be operating at very high speeds, between 807 Hz 
and 1210 Hz.  While frequency converter drives are used in many industrial control applications, these 
speeds are used only in a limited number of applications. 
 Stuxnet changes the output frequencies and thus the speed of the motors for short intervals over periods 
of months.  Interfering with the speed of the motors sabotages the normal operation of the industrial 
control process. 
 Stuxnet’s requirement for particular frequency converter drives and operating characteristics focuses the 
number of possible speculated targets to a limited set of possibilities. 
Relative to the typical uses of frequency converter drives, these frequencies are considered very high-
speed and now limit the potential speculated targets of Stuxnet.  
Efficient low-harmonic frequency converter drives that output over 600Hz are regulated for export in 
the United States by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as they can be used for uranium 
enrichment.  Operation at those frequencies occurs for a period of time, Stuxnet then hijacks the PLC 
code and begins modifying the behavior of the frequency converter drives.  In addition to other 
parameters, over a period of months, Stuxnet changes the output frequency for short periods of time to 
1410Hz and then to 2Hz and then to 1064Hz.  Modification of the output frequency essentially 
sabotages the automation system from operating properly.  (Chien, 2010) 
 
The resetting of the centrifuges’ speed resulted in a 20% breakdown of the centrifuges and 
was a serious impediment to the Iranian nuclear enrichment program, setting the production 
back with one to two years according to some estimates(Chien, 2010). 
The clandestine operation of the computer virus left Iran humiliated and the country did not 
divulge any information about the attack. Although there are no sources to who the attackers 
were, widespread speculation among web security sites and newspaper articles point to either 
Israel, the United States or a cooperation of the two states as the makers of Stuxnet. They 
stood to gain from the disruption of the Iranian nuclear program. The fact that no proof of 
origin has been brought to market since 2011, bears witness to the difficulty of attribution.  
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The Stuxnet attack is significant in that it exemplifies how a target of vital national interest 
can be sabotaged without an escalation to war. Attribution of a cyber-attack can be extremely 
difficult and Iran did not respond to the attack.  
3.2. Operation Orchard – a coordinated attack 
On September 6th. 2007, Israel launched an air strike on a suspected Syrian nuclear facility in 
Dayr- ez-Zor in. In combination with this air strike, Israel probably launched a cyber-attack 
on the Syrian radar warning systems while the physical attack was carried out. The 
assumption is that Unit 82005 of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) used a “kill-switch” 
embedded in the air-defense system by a subcontractor to render it useless(Rid, 2013, pp. 
41,42).  
In this attack, the goal of using cyber weapons was not to shut down the radar system. This 
would have raised suspicion among the Syrian forces. Instead, the cyber weapon was meant to 
make the radar system behave as normal, while at the same time cloaking the Israeli airplanes 
during their bomb run. The act of blinding the Syrian air controllers by exploiting weaknesses 
in the attacked radar system rendered the defensive measures of the Syrian forces useless. 
This attack is not well documented. Primary sources for the attack are classified. Besides it 
being mentioned by Thomas Rid, there are some apocryphal texts concerning the operation, 
but none that discuss the use cyber weapons.  In spite of this, the attack is significant in three 
ways. First, that it is one of a very few incidents where cyber weapons have been used in a 
military action. Secondly, it demonstrates how a cyber weapon can gain an advantage against 
an enemy, when used in conjunction with a physical attack.  
Thirdly, this attack along with the Stuxnet attack shows how cyber operations in general are 
kept secret both by the attacker and by the victim.  
This cyberattack was an act of sabotage. In general, sabotage is extremely hard to counter, 
both because the preparations can be concealed, materiel and men necessary for the action are 
limited in number and because the carrying out of the infiltration, sabotage and exfiltration 
often can be carried out without detection.   
Sabotage carried out by cyberattacks are far less risky for the attacker than through physical 
attacks. Operatives need not approach the target, keeping them out of harm’s reach. This 
increases the opportunities for deniability. For the defender, a sabotage attack through 
                                                 
5 Unit 8200 is an Israeli Intelligence Corps unit. 
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cyberspace will pose the same problems as do all sabotage actions; they will be prepared, 
tailored for the specific target and launched in stealth.  
It stands to reason that cyberattacks are likely to be used as instruments in international 
conflicts, but when they will be employed and how or if they will be answered will be 
determined by the gravity of their effects. 
3.3. Trump vs. Clinton – social media subversion  
In the U.S. presidential election of 2016, an influence campaign originating from Russia 
introduced a new form of cyberattack. The attack was intended to reduce Hillary Clinton’s 
chances of winning. In so doing, the campaign supported Donald Trump (Intelligence 
Community Assessment, 2017). Although the outcome of the election cannot be proved a 
direct effect of the Russian campaign, it was seen as a threat to the U.S. national security.  
The influence campaign was multifaceted and used both open messaging through Russian 
media and third parties, stealing information from the Democratic Party and uploading it to 
WikiLeaks, but more spectacularly the use of social media. 
On the 16th of February 2018, the United States Department of Justice indicted eleven 
members of the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Russian “troll factory” headquartered in 
St. Petersburg. In the indictment, the IRA was accused for engaging in operations to interfere 
with the presidential elections and political processes of the United States(U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2018).  
These activities were carried out from as early as 2014 both by stealing and compromising 
information from the Democrats in order to discredit them, bought political advertisements, 
but more significantly by subversive actions through the use of social media.  
Here, the hackers joined or started groups on social media sites, particularly on Facebook, 
Twitter and Instagram, where they created hundreds of accounts through which they sought to 
influence the public opinion by supporting radical groups.  
This way, some of the groups controlled by the IRA had hundreds of thousands of online 
followers by 2016. Although the operations were mostly carried out from Russia, Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs) were set up on servers inside the USA. This allowed the IRA to 
mask the origin of its operation. In order to spread enmity among the American electorate, the 
operation targeted both left- and right- leaning ideologies. This even included the staging of 
political rallies (Boyd et al., 2018).  
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Following the attack, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) divulged their view of the 
attack in a joint report: 
We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US 
presidential election.  Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, 
denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency.  We further assess Putin 
and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. 
“Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of 
Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, but these activities 
demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to 
previous operations (Intelligence Community Assessment, 2017). 
 
In the report, the CIA, FBI and NSA expect that “Moscow will apply lessons learned from its 
campaign aimed at the US presidential election to future influence efforts in the United States 
and worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes”(Ibid.2017).  
They also believed that Russia would “continue to consider using cyber-enabled disclosure 
operations because of their belief that these can accomplish Russian goals relatively easily 
without significant damage to Russian interests”(Ibid 2017). 
 
3.4. Hydro - Crippling the private sector 
At 8:31 on the 19th of March 2019, Norsk Hydro sent out the following news flash:  
Hydro became victim of an extensive cyber-attack in the early hours of Tuesday, March 19, 
impacting operations in several of the company's business areas. IT-systems in most business 
areas are impacted and Hydro is switching to manual operations as far as possible. Hydro is 
working to contain and neutralize the attack, but does not yet know the full extent of the situation 
(Hydro, 2019a). 
 
Hydro had been attacked by a computer virus called LockerGoga. It is part of a strain of virus 
called ransomware. Ransomware typically encrypts the contents of a computer or server, 
offering to decrypt it if a ransom is paid. LockerGoga was first reported on January 25th., 
2019 when it attacked the French engineering company Altran Technologies.   
In Hydro’s case, the attack spread across all of the company’s business areas and forced an 
isolation of all plants, switching to manual operation and procedures at the production 
facilities. The clean-up of the incident was both complex and large. All PCs and servers 
companywide had to reviewed, cleaned for any malware and restored.  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
24 
Good backup procedures form the key defense against ransomware once a system has been 
attacked, but whereas an attack can be a nuisance for a private person, it can be disruptive for 
large firms. The attack vector can be through portable media storage, E-mail attachment or 
through a supply-chain attack6 
In a press release dated March 26th, Hydro estimated that in the first week following the 
attack, financial losses mounted to between 300 and 350 million NOK. As of April 5th , 2019, 
Hydro reported in a press release that production was back to normal, but there were still 
delays in invoicing, billing and reporting (Hydro, 2019b).  
There are no indications that the attack on Hydro was state-sponsored or done with any other 
than pecuniary motives. This illustrates the difficulty of attributing cyber attacks 
The Lockergoga – attack was technologically advanced, easy to implement and extremely 
rapid, taking down the whole centralised command and control structure of Norsk Hydro 
within a very short time. The attack shows both how fast a cyber-attack is, the level of 
damage it is capable of causing and the cost and work necessary to bring the situation back to 
normal. 
Whatever the motive or provenance of this particular attack, it still serves as a good example 
of how vital, national interests can be threatened or destabilized by targeting and attacking the 
private sector. 
  
                                                 
6 An attack on a company computer system through its suppliers’ or partners’ access to the same system.  
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4.Deterrence theory and cyberspace 
Finding causes to events and predicting effects is difficult in a world full of chance and 
variation. To do so, theories highlight certain events while others are given less relevance. A 
simplification of the world, a theory will generalize in order to explain a subject.  
In order to discuss deterrence and its application in cyberspace, it is first necessary to 
understand how the theory of deterrence has developed. Next, deterrence by punishment and 
deterrence by denial are presented before the application of these theories in cyberspace is 
discussed.  
4.1. The origins of deterrence theory  
Deterrence is a strategy intended to discourage an opponent from hostile action. It has been an 
integral part of security policy ever since the dawn of human conflict, but it was the advent of 
the Cold War that made deterrence into the main strategic goal. The development of nuclear 
weapons caused a “true revolution” in strategy and made deterrence by punishment more 
important that deterrence by denial (Jervis, Lebow, & Stein, 1985, p. 2).  
André Beaufre has given a good explanation of the deterrence strategy with and without 
nuclear weapons. According to him, the nuclear strategy, due to the lack of an effective 
defence against destruction, rests upon a negative capability, which is to “avoid the great trial 
of strength, in other words deterrence” (Beaufre, 1965, pp. 23-33). 
The prenuclear strategy, according to Beaufre, rested on a positive capability to win large 
gains with small losses. The logical defense to this would be to ensure that the cost of the 
attack far outweighed the benefits. The effect of this strategy was a continual arms race. 
Kaufmann points this out as the main reason why the United States opted for massive 
retaliation to supplant the matching of the enemy gun- by- gun, tank- by- tank: 
“the recently terminated Korean war, fought to a stalemate at a tremendous sacrifice in 
American lives and treasure”…“jeopardized the prospects for a balanced budget” “Its 
embarrassments and risks certainly invited the institution of a policy that would achieve the 
same deterrent effects without the accompanying economic and political strains.”(Kaufmann, 
1954) 
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Introduced by the Eisenhower administration, massive retaliation with nuclear weapons 
became the answer to both conventional and nuclear attacks.  
Nuclear weapons did not deter lower level aggression. To remedy this, a new policy was 
introduced by the Kennedy administration in 1961. Dubbed “Flexible Response (House, 1961, 
pp. 6,7)”, it reflected the incapacity of nuclear weapons to deter low-level aggression. 
Constituting a break with the “New Look”- policy of the Eisenhower administration, the new 
strategy allowed for a stepped escalation of intensity through the use of conventional 
offensive and defensive capabilities, rather than a leap directly to massive retaliation.  
Eventually, the nuclear arsenal of the superpowers grew into a state that created a stalemate of 
mutual assured destruction (MAD). The risks involved with a nuclear holocaust made 
statesmen embrace deterrence, as it seemed to be a viable solution for balancing the 
precarious situation of two superpowers armed to the teeth. The deterrence of nuclear 
weapons was maintained through various strategies, ranging from military parades, 
deployment, multiple re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) hardened launch sites and nuclear tests. It 
was the ultimate deterrent of the nuclear weapons that spurred the academic study of 
deterrence.  
4.2. Deterrence by punishment 
Patrick Morgan describes the essence of deterrence as “manipulating someone’s behavior by 
threatening him with harm”(Morgan, 1983, pp. 11-17). Morgan further argues that the 
success or failure of deterrence takes place in the mind of a potential attacker. He 
acknowledges that the cost/benefit calculation is important, but he also underlines that the 
effectiveness of deterrence is dependent upon the fear that it induces.(Morgan, 1983, p. 23) 
On a national scale it is the state that is responsible for deterring enemies, safeguarding “its 
military security, the integrity of its political life, and the well-being of its people.”(Kennan, 
1985, p. 218) 
In an international context, “Deterrence theory began and prospered not out of the analysis of 
particular cases but as an abstract analysis of the behaviour to be expected when two sides 
are able to threaten each other”(Jervis et al., 1985, p. 1).  
Mearsheimer identifies the objective of deterrence as developing in the mind of the adversary 
a fear of the consequences of his actions or a “function of costs and risks” (Mearsheimer, 
1985). This is echoed by Brantly who states that “the most common form of deterrence known 
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as conventional deterrence … focuses on the ex-ante dissuasion of adversaries through the 
threat of expost costs in response to potential adversary actions (Brantly, 2018, p. 32). 
Whether the scale is on an individual or a national scale, deterrence is linked to the perception 
of risk and punishment. To be effective, deterrence must be credible and clearly understood 
by the recipient that is to be deterred.  
Williams and Hawkins develop this further, saying that deterrence  «… implies a 
psychological process whereby individuals are deterred from committing criminal acts only if 
they perceive legal sanctions as certain, swift and/or severe.”(Williams & Hawkins, 1986)  
The classic formulation as a strategy for conflict management was given by William 
Kaufmann in his memorandum “Requirements of Deterrence”  
Essentially, deterrence means preventing certain types of contingencies from arising. To 
achieve this objective it becomes necessary to communicate in some way to a prospective 
antagonist what is likely to happen to him should he create the situation in question. The 
expectation is that, confronted with this prospect, he will be deterred from taking the action 
that is regarded as inimical--at least so long as other less intolerable alternatives are open to 
him (Kaufmann, 1954). 
 
Kaufmann further stresses that the credibility of a state’s commitment is vital. The three 
necessary criteria for achieving this are capability, cost and intention. 
Capability is defined as the defender’s ability to inflict harm upon the aggressor. “The enemy 
must be persuaded not only that the instrument exists but also that its power is 
operational.(Kaufmann, 1954)” 
Costs are defined as the cost that the aggressor will risk from launching an attack. These must 
be «greater than the advantages to be won from attaining the objective (Kaufmann, 1954).” 
Intention is defined as the policy of the defender and it will be interpreted by the aggressor 
based on three main factors, popular support, previous behaviour and public statements.  
Lebow iterates on Kaufmann’s point of popular support, pointing out that domestic problems 
can “be so severe as to arouse concern for the frangibility of the state itself” (Lebow, 1985b, 
p. 182).   
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Lebow follows Kaufmann in his main findings and has set forth four conditions for 
deterrence. 
 Credibility. 
In order for deterrence to work, the aggressor must be assured of the defender’s 
commitment to defend his interests with force. The aggressor must also be convinced 
of the defender’s ability to fight.  
 Communication.  
The capability and resolve to fight must be announced both in words as well as in 
action. This puts a toll on the communication process of the defender, but the 
reception of the aggressor is no less important. The aggressor will interpret the 
signals he gets but will not necessarily grasp the meaning of what he receives in the 
same way as it was intended to be understood.  
 Repeatedly publicised. 
This must be done in order to keep the defender’s policy in the mind of the aggressor, 
the defender and the public.  
 Clearly defined.  
The nature of the punishment must be clearly understood by the aggressor. In theory, 
a rational aggressor will weigh the costs and benefits and will, if the costs are 
sufficiently higher than the benefits, be deterred (Lebow, 1985a, pp. 204-211). 
Another vital point where Lebow, Morgan and Kaufmann are in accord is the importance of 
the intention, resolve and defiance of the defender and that they must be outspoken, In 
addition, the aggressor must be convinced that action will follow words.   
In spite of this, Lebow maintains that deterrence theory is of little help to predict state 
behaviour or as a strategy of conflict management. He maintains that deterrence may even 
provoke the very behaviour it seeks to prevent.  In his words, the most fundamental 
characteristic of deterrence theory is that it is “a system of abstract logic all of whose 
postulates have been derived deductively” (Lebow, 1985a, pp. 206-211).  
4.3. Deterrence by denial 
Denial is a deterrent measure intended to reduce an adversary’s ability to intrude or interfere. 
It “ deters an attack by convincing an attacker there will be no gains commensurate with the 
cost of attack” (Philbin, 2013).  As is evident from the discussion above, during the cold war, 
deterrence by punishment left deterrence by denial in the shadows.  
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The ultimate deterrent of nuclear weapons affected the academic discussion, and the focus 
was on punishment. Even though denial strategies were carried out or proposed, such as the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)7, hardened missile silos and bomb shelters, denial was seen 
as too costly or insufficient against nuclear attacks.  
4.4. Deterring cyberattacks  
Today, the legacy of nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent to prevent full-scale war is still 
with us. The same is the case with conventional forces. They are still kept to deter and contain 
smaller conflicts. The introduction of cyberspace has created new tools for war and a new 
arena for international conflict. The fact that private persons have acquired the necessary 
skills and resources to perform serious attacks in cyberspace clearly shows how inexpensive 
cyber weapons are in comparison to physical weapon systems. 
The relatively low cost of entry into cyberspace is highlighted as an important reason to why 
cyberspace has turned into a field of conflict. (Sheldon, 2012) If, by using cyber weapons, a 
state could attain its objectives at a fraction of the cost of a kinetic attack, the cost/benefit 
ratio would indicate the facility by which a state would turn to using cyber weapons. 
Do cyberattacks necessitate other responses than those that have proved to be sufficient in the 
past? Tolga claims that: 
Deterrence theory in cyberspace differs from the classic nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence 
in the aspects of actors and means. Cyber deterrence, at its very core, is a result of states’ desire to avoid 
being attacked in or via cyberspace. Potential targets include their military networks, the networks of 
state or private firms or any element of the state critical infrastructure (industrial systems, finance, 
publicity, communication lines, power grid and transportation)(Tolga, 2018, p. 7). 
 
Does the new attack vector through cyberspace supersede traditional deterrent instruments of 
coercion?  
Nye does not seem to be of this opinion. He argues that “even when punishment is used, 
deterrent threats need not be limited to cyber responses, and they may address general 
behavior as well as specific acts”(Nye Jr, 2017, p. 45). 
If the argument of Thomas Rid holds, there will be no cyberwar. Rid links this to Clausewitz’ 
postulate that “war is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will”   
                                                 
7 The Strategic Defense Initiative or “Star Wars” was a missile defense program proposed by the Reagan 
Administration to protect the United States against incoming ballistic nuclear missiles by space- and ground 
based missile-, particle beam- and laser weapons systems.  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
30 
If, Rid says, an act is “not potentially violent, it’s not an act of war and it’s not an armed 
attack”(Rid, 2013, p. 1).  
He links this to the non- violent nature of cyberattacks. In general, Rid says, cyberattacks are 
either not lethal, or the lethality is caused not by the cyber weapon, but by some malfunction 
of the attacked system itself. 
Following Rid’s argument, it is difficult to see how non-violent trespasses in cyberspace can 
escalate to physical war. This may reduce the deterrent value of physical instruments in 
dealing with cyber-attacks. 
4.5. The security dilemma in cyberspace 
The security dilemma is a theory of offense and defense. Its argument states that conflict and 
war is more likely to occur when the offence has the supremacy over defense. 
The theory puts technology as the primary cause to the prevailing supremacy of either the 
defense or the offense at a given time. In cyberspace, the prevalent perception is that the 
offense has the supremacy at the moment. Jervis puts up the cost of defense versus the cost of 
defense as one criteria to whether states will seek to create offensive or defensive weapons. If 
the cost of attack is less or equal to the cost of defense, then offensive weapons will be 
created.(Art & Jervis, 2009, p. 91)  
A multitude of programs, systems, devices and users in cyberspace create innumerable 
opportunities for attacks8. At the same time, the cost of cyber weapons is negligible on a 
national scale. Even though an attack in cyberspace may cost an attacker millions, it will still 
be dwarfed by the cost of development, maintenance, training, readiness and deployment of 
any physical weapons system. Tolga points out that: “there is less will to deter actions in 
cyber space, causing weakened deterrence. This allows actors to behave more boldly in 
cyberspace both in peace or war”(Tolga, 2018, p. 7). 
 This may result from the fact that so far, attacks in cyberspace have not caused a level of 
damage severe enough to seriously threaten a state.  
Defending against cyber-attacks not only demands constant vigilance, but continual 
development of security software and practices. This is very expensive and as these measures 
are reactive, they leave the initiative in the hands of the attacker. 
                                                 
8 Components and code are made by different companies. Each product will have its own specific vulnerabilities, 
which can be exploited.  
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Sheldon links the supremacy of the offensive both to the severity of an attack and to the 
problem of attribution. (Sheldon, 2012)  
4.6. Attribution 
Attribution is no easy task in cyberspace. By the use of proxies or other unobtrusive methods, 
malware can be introduced in ways that do not arouse suspicion or reveal its origin. 
Destruction of evidence is another way to hide the identity of an attacker. The Stuxnet worm 
was programmed to erase itself, whereas the personnel of the Internet Research Agency 
“deleted and destroyed data, including emails, social media accounts, and other evidence of 
their activities” (Justice, 2018). In spite of this, these efforts will not assure the attackers 
anonymity. F- secure9 is sanguine in their view on attribution. In their view, investigators will 
correlate information from metadata such as:  
IP addresses used in attacks, the language and email addresses used in phishing campaigns and other 
correspondence, social engineering tactics, TTPs used for persistence and lateral movement, or even 
time correlations between outbound connections from an ISP and subsequent outgoing connections 
from a VPN exit node are used to paint this picture. As careful as attackers might be, it’s going to be 
almost impossible to prevent authorities from putting the puzzle together (F-Secure, 2017). 
 
This is in part connected to the way tracks can be obscured 
Investigation of who is behind an attack is not impossible, but it is rendered difficult by the 
way the origin of an attack can be obscured by attacking through proxies, such as supply 
chain attacks, or by manipulation of the signs that investigators use to identify the This may 
throw the investigators off the scent or convince them that the blame lies elsewhere. 
Attribution is insecure, as illustrated in appendix B where attribution is stated in the following 
manner: “NCSC assess with high confidence that the GRU was almost certainly responsible.” 
For deterrence, it is not only the identity of the attacker that is important. It is also about 
getting the information in time. Attribution is time-consuming, reducing the window of 
opportunity for retaliation. 
  
                                                 
9 F-Secure is a Finnish antivirus and cyber security company 
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4.7. Severity 
So far, there have been no instances where an attack in cyberspace has induced a breakout of 
war between two states. The explanation may be that states have not gone to war, - yet-. 
Early cyberattacks were mainly used as an arena for hackers to show their skills and both the 
malware and types of attacks were mostly unsophisticated.  
Stuxnet was different from all of these. It wasn’t an evolution in malware, but a revolution. The 
idea that someone would create such a sophisticated worm to slither blindly through networks 
in search of a single target was “leaps and bounds” beyond what the Symantec researchers had 
expected (Zetter, 2011). 
 
Since then, there has been a development of state- sponsored attacks in cyberspace.  
 APTs10 are long-term, covert malware campaigns run by well-funded teams who are typically backed 
by the resources of a nation state. The playbook for such attacks is to stay “low and slow” in an 
organization’s infrastructure over a long period of time, allowing the attackers to gather detailed 
information on the target enterprise. The usual goal of these malware campaigns is ongoing theft of 
highly confidential data or even disruption of operations. (Ibid. 2011) 
  
The APTs are far more sinister than private hackers. With the funding and resources of a 
state, they are able to inflict far more damage. The cases of Stuxnet, the Russian campaign 
against the U.S. presidential election and the Titan Rain attacks11 testify to this. 
There may be several reasons why states have chosen not to go to war after having suffered an 
attack in cyberspace. If the severity of an attack is low, the defender may choose not to 
escalate the conflict. This may be the result of several factors. 
One factor may be that the effects of the attack are not perceived by the victim state to be 
severe enough to justify an armed attack. Another factor may be that the cyber weapons have 
been constructed (tailored) in such a way that the effects of the attack will not invoke an 
armed response. A third reason may be that an acknowledgement of a cyber-attack would 
make the struck state lose face. This could compel it to deny that the attack had taken place. 
  
                                                 
10 Advanced Persistent Threats 
11 Titan Rain was a series of coordinated attacks on government and private companies. Significant targets were: 
Lockheed Martin, Sandia National laboratories (involved in national security, nuclear weapons design, defense 
systems and energy) and Redstone Arsenal (home to NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, U.S. Army Combat 
Capabilities Development Command Aviation & Missile Center, Missile Defense Agency, DIA /  Missile and 
Space Intelligence Center, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Program Executive Office Aviation and 
the U.S. Army Materiel Command.(Hamnes, 2012) 
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5.How to deter cyber-attacks? 
This chapter will first show how cyber-attacks are deterred today through denial, showing 
how this is organized and the challenges to this approach. Next, deterrence by punishment is 
presented with an appreciation of the restraints posed by International Law and what results 
this strategy can incur.  
Cyberspace is for all purposes an unrestricted, anarchic area, where national borders are fuzzy 
and prosecution is restricted to national legislation. In the absence of international laws, it 
may be that it is rather the fear of retaliation that makes countries refrain from launching 
attacks in cyberspace. As proven by their track record, revisionist and authoritarian states like 
Russia, Iran, China and North Korea, there has been little to threaten or dissuade their 
subversive attacks and espionage. 
Although international law eventually could play a more important role in the ordering of 
cyberspace, this is not yet the case, as NATO testifies in that it:  
will exercise restraint and act in accordance with international law. The Alliance also welcomed efforts 
undertaken in other international fora to develop norms of responsible state behaviour and confidence-
building measures to foster a more transparent and stable cyberspace for the international 
community”(NATO, 2018) 
 
What course to take in order to deter hostile attacks in cyberspace is not easy. There are 
proponents for several ways of response. All carry their own specific strengths and 
weaknesses. Deterrence can be achieved through a combination of defensive and offensive 
measures. The U.S Department of Defense explains this in its “Cyber Strategy” where in 
order to deter cyber-attacks it and seek:  
“to use all instruments of national power to deter adversaries from conducting malicious cyberspace 
activity that would threaten U.S. national interests, our allies, or our partners. The Department will 
prioritize securing sensitive DoD information and deterring malicious cyber activities that constitute a 
use of force against the United States, our allies, or our partners. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force 
stands ready to employ the full range of military capabilities in response (U.S. Department of 
Defense2018, p. 1). 
 
Further, the U.S. DoD will: “counter cyber campaigns threatening U.S. military advantage by 
defending forward to intercept and halt cyber threats and by strengthening the cybersecurity 
of systems and networks that support DoD missions”(Ibid. 2018, p. 4). 
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Cyber weapons differ from nuclear weapons in that they cannot function as a deterrent by 
their existence alone. Whereas the effectiveness of a nuclear weapon is not diminished, even 
though its potential is known, a cyber weapon’s effectiveness seizes once its potential is 
revealed. This lies in the fact that it is a logical weapon. Once it is used, its mode of operation 
will be revealed, and it will no longer have any value. The enemy will recognise it if it is 
launched a second time and be able to protect himself.  
 
An attack in the real world is expensive to launch both in preparation and in execution. 
Weapon systems, training, readiness, logistics, maintenance and manoeuvre are costly, 
difficult to conceal from the enemy and if the enemy is forewarned and given the opportunity 
to prepare countermeasures, catastrophic losses can ensue.  
In themselves, these are important barriers for launching an attack in the physical world. The 
cost of deterrence in the physical world is equally expensive, but the credibility of a carrier 
group or a nuclear submarine is undisputable. Their range and latent capacity of destructive 
power are tangible threats and gives an attacker a clear indication of what could be the 
response to aggressive action. 
Another obstacle for deterrence in cyberspace is the non-lethal character of cyberattacks.  
The U.S. National Cyber Strategy argues: 
 that an offense-defense strategic framework must be adopted, once again, in order to think about and 
organize against threats in cyberspace…cyberspace is an environment of offense dominance in which 
deterrence is easily overwhelmed…Implementing a dedicated deterrence strategy against cyber 
aggression entails establishing a credible commitment to respond to attacks. The credibility of 
deterrence depends on the capability to detect attack, determine its source, and inflict appropriate cost in 
response. Importantly, the political will to carry out the promised retaliation must be signalled clearly in 
advance of any aggression. Cyberspace raises significant challenges on all of these necessary 
components for successful deterrence (The White House, 2018, p. 10). 
 
5.1. Deterrence by denial 
Denial is a deterrent measure intended to reduce an adversary’s ability to intrude or interfere.  
It “deters an attack by convincing an attacker there will be no gains commensurate with the 
cost of attack” (Philbin, 2013).  
In cyberspace, denial is done through several defensive measures. Vulnerabilities in a system 
are reduced through good routines and keeping software up-to-date. Control of entry points is 
carried out through control of passwords and credentials, Systems are layered and access to 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
35 
higher levels is restricted. Security software scans for malignant software to stop intrusion 
through mail and portable memory storage.  
There are several reasons why denial strategies are not at the centre of the deterrence. The 
first is that denial will not inflict any pain on the aggressor. As discussed earlier, this is not 
easily achieved through denial alone. 
Philbin’s argument highlights three of the main problems with halting hostile intrusion in 
cyberspace. The first is connected with the security problem. Presently, as previously 
discussed under 4.5, the offense has the superiority over defense (ibid.2013). 
 The second is that an attack in cyberspace is cost beneficial when compared to a physical 
attack (ibid.2013). This is a result of the relative cost and effect of a cyber weapon as 
compared to a physical weapons system. 
The third is that in cyberspace, defensive measures can be probed continuously with impunity 
(ibid.2013). Denial will not inflict any pain on the aggressor. 
Given that the offensive has the upper hand in cyberspace, defending against attacks in 
cyberspace is no simple matter.  
5.1.1. National policy: Organization, actors and 
responsibility in cyberdefense 
Following the increased vulnerability of modern society, vital sectors have through their 
connected command and control systems, become attainable targets. As a consequence, it has 
become necessary to adopt new defensive measures to safeguard them. This is done partly 
through technical solutions like firewalls, authentication, passwords, virus scans and 
encryption to reduce opportunities for ingress. Backup routines and computer emergency 
readiness teams (CERT) are employed to reduce serious damage caused by security breaches, 
and surveillance and cross- sectorial cooperation increase the awareness of threats. Social 
media are for the most part controlled by multinational companies and have until today only 
to a minimal degree been subjected to national control in respect of their content. This is 
probably a result of a lack of need until the Russian attack on the U.S.A during the 
presidential election of 2016. 
As the United States is the target of most cyberattacks worldwide, it may be used as an 
example of how cyberdefense can be organized, although this may be done differently in 
other countries.  
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In the USA, it is the Department of Homeland Security and its subsidiary, the US National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) that is tasked with reducing 
the risk of systemic cybersecurity and communications challenges across public and private 
sector networks. Other aspects of the country’s cybersecurity such as intelligence and 
investigation are delegated to the CIA, NSA and FBI. It is worth noting that these agencies 
reach out to the private sector for information exchange and that the agencies are interlinked 
through many joint task forces and committees.  
The US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) serves as 
the national hub for cyber and communications information, technical expertise, and 
operational integration, and operates a round-the-clock situational awareness, analysis, and 
incident response center Its stakeholders are the federal government, the private sector and 
some international partners. In addition, come the states, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) 
governments. Through the Einstein program, the NCCIC, collects, correlates, analyzes, and 
shares security information to protect the federal computer networks. The NCCIC is not 
responsible for the cybersecurity of the private sector, but supports it through information 
exchange, education and training, incident response capabilities and malware analysis. In 
addition, cybersecurity assessments are offered, such as vulnerability-, Red Team-, and 
Phishing campaign assessments. Through the Industrial Control Systems Joint Working 
Group (ICSJWG), the NCCIC collaborates with the private sector in order to reduce risk to 
the nation’s industrial control systems. This is done across all critical infrastructure 
sectors.(US Department of Homeland security)   
Intelligence gathering is a necessary part of defense. It provides information about hostile 
actors. In the United States, this task is carried out by the CIA and NSA.  
The CIA’s primary mission is “to collect, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate foreign 
intelligence to assist the President and senior US government policymakers in making 
decisions relating to national security”(CIA, 2018). To support this mission, the newly 
formed Directorate of Digital Innovation supplies “cutting-edge digital and cyber tradecraft 
and IT infrastructure(Ibid.2017). The CIA is naturally reticent about what it does, since 
divulging information will inform both the public and the country’s adversaries.(Fox-
Brewster, 2017)  
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The NSA’s main role in cybersecurity is to help protect and defend national security systems. 
This is done by carrying out foreign intelligence, surveilling the development and operation of 
hostile foreign powers’ cyberspace capabilities. This information is used to develop solutions 
to counter threats, implement strategic defensive measures and to publish guidance to 
cybersecurity professionals.(NSA, 2019)  
Investigation and prosecution is an equally important element in reducing the threat in 
cyberspace. The FBI is the lead federal agency for investigating cyber-attacks by criminals, 
overseas adversaries, and terrorists. This is done through a cyber division with specially 
trained cybersquads at the headquarter and at the FBI’s field offices. The goal is to finding the 
hackers’ identity and bring them to justice. The FBI is also the lead federal agency 
responsible for investigating foreign influence operations. In 2017, the Foreign Influence Task 
Force (FITF) was established to identify and counteract malign foreign influence operations 
targeting the United States. Through the FITF, the FBI approaches this threat by: 
 Investigations and operations:  
The FITF works with FBI field offices across the country to counter the extensive influence operations 
of our foreign adversaries. 
 Information and intelligence sharing:  
The FBI works closely with other intelligence community agencies, as well as with state and local law 
enforcement partners and election officials, to ensure a common understanding of the threat and a 
unified strategy to address it.  
 Private sector partnerships:  
The FBI considers strategic engagement with U.S. technology companies, including threat indicator 
sharing, to be important in combating foreign influence actors.(FBI, 2019). 
5.1.2. The private sector 
Private companies represent one of the vectors of attack that can be and have been used to 
destabilize 12a state (Fox-Brewster, 2017). The trouble of protecting these companies against 
hostile attacks is that the prime motive of private companies is to earn money and that they 
concentrate on that mission. General economic theory postulates that in order to maximise 
profits, all unnecessary activities will be reduced to a minimum, streamlining the organization 
                                                 
12 Privately held companies of different sectors (e.g. military industry, finance, energy, production etc.) can be 
targeted in order to steal information vital to national security, sabotaged to reduce   
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for operation in a normal situation, where the risk is known. This is also the case for IT 
security. Although a private company may be resilient and withstand cyber-attacks, they will 
not, unless the company is an IT security firm, have the necessary resources or expertise to 
withstand determined attacks from state-sponsored hackers.  
Today, these companies are for the most part left to fend for themselves. As shown above in 
the case of the NCCIC, they do receive some assistance from their governments either as 
warnings of cyber activity or as some help in forensics and in the rebuilding of their 
infrastructure once, they have been attacked. In their daily run however, they are on their own. 
Given the supremacy of the offensive within cyberspace, private companies will never be able 
to spend enough money to defend themselves against attacks from advanced state-sponsored 
hacking.  
In a perspective of defense, it would make sense that companies that constitute vital, national 
interest should be shielded by their state, since only a state has the sufficient resources to 
shoulder this responsibility. This is evident in the U.S. National Cyber strategy, signed in 
September 2018, where the United States pledged that it would: 
use all appropriate tools of national power to expose and counter the flood of online malign influence 
and information campaigns and non-state propaganda and disinformation «and “prevent the use of 
digital platforms for malign foreign influence operations while respecting civil rights and 
liberties(House, 2018). 
 
This may also point towards an evolution to a higher degree of integration and cooperation in 
and between the sectors. Unfortunately, the development of multinational companies and 
cloud computing, where vital information is stored or control systems operate outside a state’s 
jurisdiction complicate such efforts.  
5.1.3. The media 
The media sector is a special case. Here, it is not only the danger of sabotage that threaten the 
sector, but subversion. A community without internal cohesion can easily fall prey to external 
pressures.  
 How can freedom of speech be safeguarded when stopping hostile information campaigns 
demands censorship? Subversive attacks may destabilize a state by eroding the cohesion of its 
society. How can “fake news”, conspiracy theories and destabilization attempts be stopped 
when it is spread by a legal news company like Russia Today (RT)(Torvik, 2019) or such 
information is legally uploaded to social media, outside the jurisdiction of the victim state? 
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Lack of internal cohesion, like the way that President Trump has downplayed the Russian 
subversive actions in the Presidential election in 2016, can be seen as an opportunity for 
further involvement by the Russian trolling campaign.  
This was expressed by the CIA, FBI and NSA, who “assess Moscow will apply lessons 
learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the US presidential election to future 
influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election 
processes”(Assessment, 2017). 
5.1.4. Legal sanctions and prosecution 
Taking legal sanctions against state-backed hackers is difficult. The first obstacle is attribution 
as stated in a declassified report by the CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency: 
The Intelligence Community rarely can publicly reveal the full extent of its knowledge or the precise 
bases for its assessments, as the release of such information would reveal sensitive sources or methods 
and imperil the ability to collect critical foreign intelligence in the future (Assessment, 2017). 
 
Jurisdiction is another obstacle. Although the FBI indicted the leaders of the Russian Internet 
Research Agency in 2018, there can be little hope of bringing any of them to justice. Legal 
sanctions against foreign nationals living within the nation responsible for the attack can serve 
no other purpose than showing the public that the attack and how it was accomplished did not 
go unnoticed. It is unlikely that apart from the humiliation of being called out, legal sanctions 
against the agents of an attack will not deter that nation from carrying on with its operations. 
 
There is another way to reduce the access and opportunity for foreign subversive interventions 
through social media platforms. As discussed earlier, private companies’ main focus is to 
make profits. Social media companies have not taken editorial responsibility or willingly 
introduced checks to malignant content, both because the tradition of the Internet has been 
free from censorship, but also because this would reduce profits.   
When Mark Zuckerberg in March 2019 asked governments around the world to take 
responsibility for legislation against malware, election security, privacy and data portability, it 
was to forestall the possibility that Facebook may be held liable for what is posted on its 
platform.  
Presented in a report on disinformation and fake news delivered February 2019 to the House 
of Commons, this is in fact proposed as a solution to reduce the impact of cyber-attacks by 
law. Here, national legislation is forwarded as a bulwark against foreign influence campaigns. 
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The report suggests that the service providers must assume legal liability for the content on 
their platforms: 
  Compulsory Code of Ethics for tech companies overseen by independent regulator 
 Regulator given powers to launch legal action against companies breaching code 
 Government to reform current electoral communications laws and rules on overseas involvement in UK 
elections 
 Social media companies obliged to take down known sources of harmful content, including proven 
sources of disinformation(House of Commons, 2019) 
 
It is to be expected that the social media companies will enforce restriction of hostile 
intervention if they face prosecution and fines for serving as the medium for malign content.  
5.1.5. International cooperation 
International Law and cooperation have yet to come onto the stage in the fight to control 
malignant behaviour in cyberspace. In October 2018, the first UN panel discussion was held 
on whether International Law applies to cyberspace and what other responses states should 
consider. Although the discussion has started, there is still no general agreement and there is 
probably a long way to go before it will be legally binding. Liis Vihul of Cyber Law 
International speculated “that major cyber powers are unwilling to discuss red lines for 
offensive cyber activity” (Vihul, UN). Other international organizations like the EU and 
NATO have come further and have implemented or prepare action plans to curb attacks in 
cyberspace.  
5.2. Deterrence by punishment 
Alcibiades is quoted as having said “Men do not rest content with parrying a blow of a 
superior, but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made”.(Thucydides, ca. 
420 BCE).  
Donald Rumsfeld said of terrorism: “You can't defend at every place at every time against 
every technique. You just can't do it, because they just keep changing techniques and time, 
and you have to go after them. And you have to take it to them, and that means you have to 
preempt them”(Woodward, 2004, p. 34) 
From the Peloponnesian war to the war on terrorism, deterrence by offensive measures has a 
long history. 
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5.2.1. Deterrence by physical force 
There is no one way to safeguard against cyber-attacks. Technologically, they will change so 
rapidly, and the ways of attacking are so manifold, that in spite of constant development of 
defensive measures and a constant vigil, the walls will not be safe. Could retaliation or pre-
emption with physical force function as a way to reduce the flow of serious attacks? 
The first question that arises when it comes to retaliation with physical is how it can be done. 
Retaliation must inflict enough pain on the attacker that he will refrain from committing a 
hostile action or to stop committing it.  
One solution could be to look at the strategy that Israel employs in its dealings with non-state 
groups. This has been dubbed “mowing the lawn”. It reflects the assumption that Israel is in a 
continuous conflict and that the sensible way to act is to accept a certain level of risk and 
launch military actions when the enemy’s capabilities rise above this level. (Inbar & Shamir, 
2014)   
The “lawn mower” strategy is probably appropriate In Israel’s case, for in this situation the 
opposing groups are weaker than the state that defends itself. The resources of a non-state 
group is not comparable to the resources of a state and physical attacks with the resources 
available to a state will be effective. Nevertheless, they will at best only reduce the severity of 
the attacks for a limited time. 
Another solution could be retaliation with physical attacks that so seriously cripple the 
attacker that he will not have the ability to attack again.  
Neither of these solutions seem to be viable. Coercion or signalling by using offensive 
physical measures in the fashion of the Israeli strategy cannot make the conflict disappear.  
In cases where the attacker is equally capable of threatening the defender with physical 
weapons, it is difficult to see how retaliation or pre-emption with physical force can be done 
without risking an escalation to an armed conflict. 
5.2.2. Legal aspects 
Another important aspect that must be considered is how an armed response to an attack in 
cyberspace can be done in accordance with Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello. Although the 
international law of armed conflict (LOAC) does not necessarily concern hostile attacks in 
cyberspace, it is up to the attacked state to define such an attack as a cause for the lawful use 
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of violence. Retaliation to an attack in cyberspace will in the case physical force is used, be 
bound by the LOAC and must follow the regulations set down for distinction, necessity and 
proportionality. 
The example of the Russian interference in the US presidential election of 2016 exemplifies 
the problems of an armed response. The interference can be seen as a clear breach of the 
sovereignty set down in the Westphalian Treaty, where each state was free as Henry 
Kissinger described it “to choose its own domestic structure and religious orientation free 
from intervention” (Kissinger, 2015). 
 
Article 2 In the U.N. Charter further states that: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945). 
In both instances, the interference in a state’s internal affairs by another state is seen as 
unlawful. Article 51 in the U.N. charter leaves every state the right to defend itself if it suffers 
an armed attack. Would it be possible to interpret this interference in cyberspace as an attack 
that could lawfully be answered by a physical attack? In such cases, the criteria of distinction, 
necessity and proportionality must be met. 
Distinction is connected to what can be considered as lawful targets in war. Physical weapons 
can function well as agents of deterrence. They may be used to retaliate and inflict swift, 
certain and severe punishment to the attacker. Nevertheless, offensive retaliatory measures in 
the physical world incur a high probability of collateral damage. Retaliation by a physical 
attack would have to adhere to Jus in Bello, where the St. Petersburg declaration gives the 
principle of distinction: “the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.” This means that 
civilian targets are unlawful according to the LOAC. 
The principle of necessity is contained within the LOAC. This is interpreted as: 
only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is 
required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial 
submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and 
resources(Ministy of Defence, 2004). 
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 Although violent action can be seen as an appropriate response, the principle sets up the 
limits to what kind of weapons, targets and actions that are permissible in conflicts. An armed 
response to a cyber-attack will be held to this account, even though the cyber-attack is not.  
Proportionality is the third criterion that must be considered in connection with armed attacks. 
Retaliating to a cyberattack with a conventional or a nuclear attack raises the question of how 
this can be seen as a proportionate use of force. Sheldon argues that cyber power is not 
coercive, and although cyber weapons may be used in sync with physical attacks, they 
generally exploit deficiencies in the defender’s own systems(Sheldon, 2012). 
Thomas Rid is in agreement with Sheldon as to the non-violence of cyber weapons, stating: 
“most cyber-attacks are not violent and cannot sensibly be understood as a form of violent 
action. And those cyber attacks that actually do have the potential of force, actual or realized, 
are bound to be violent only indirectly” (Rid, 2013, p. 12). 
It is particularly proportionality as set forth in the LOAC that sets up important barriers for a 
defender. The LOAC primarily acknowledges violence as a legitimate casus belli, and this 
may make it difficult to legitimize the use of violence as a reply in kind to cyberattacks, given 
their non-violent nature. Since the origin of a cyber-attack often is obscure, there is a problem 
of legally attributing the blame and retaliating with physical force. The severity of a 
cyberattack reduces the lawful grounds for an armed response. The attacker may also use this 
factor to reduce the severity of an attack, thereby reducing the opportunity for the defender of 
lawful retaliation with physical weapons.  
5.2.3. Deterrence with cyber weapons 
Kaufmann makes an important distinction when it comes to the ability to respond to a threat; 
“Potential as against actual capability cannot be regarded as a convincing instrument of 
deterrence”.(Kaufmann, 1954)  
Kaufmann’s dictum is undisputed in the case of nuclear weapons. This policy is continued by 
the USA in the introduction of dissuasion. It is intended to persuade: 
the adversary of the futility of competition with the United States, either on a general basis or in a 
particular category of military power, which could be nuclear weapons or fighter aircraft or attack 
submarines or anything else. The goal is to lead the adversary to conclude that it would be pointless to 
compete in the acquisition of military capabilities (Yost, 2003). 
 
To attain credibility in cyberspace, both the speed of responding to an attack and the manner 
of the response, i.e. the deterrent measures that are used, are vital. What sets cyber weapons in 
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another category from nuclear or conventional weapons is their characteristics. There can be 
no parades or test firing as with nuclear weapons. Cyber weapons cannot be stockpiled in 
order to function as a threat to an enemy. Like the hollow, wooden horse at the gates of Troy, 
cyber weapons are logical weapons. Once they are put to use, they will be depleted, since the 
defender will be able to study and counter them.  
Langner has called Stuxnet a one-shot weapon. Once it was discovered, the attackers would never be 
able to use it or a similar ploy again without Iran growing immediately suspicious of malfunctioning 
equipment (Zetter, 2011). 
 
Using offensive cyber weapons to retaliate will also procure the aggressor with information of 
the defender’s general capabilities in cyberspace. That information will help to refine his next 
attack or may make him try to attack in another way or to strike at another target. It would 
also mean that the aggressor’s defense will be strengthened, reducing the opportunity for 
retaliation at a later date. The development of offensive cyber weapons to deter an enemy 
without using them is unlikely to have any effect. The use of offensive cyber weapons that 
harm the opponent is likely to turn into an arms race with a high probability of escalation to 
an armed conflict. 
Unless cyber weapons are used, they are not credible and because of the development in 
cyberspace, they will soon become obsolete. Once a cyber weapon has been used, its 
usefulness ceases. 
One way to retaliate within cyberspace could be to use offensive weapons that are less 
sophisticated than the defender is capable of producing. This might be done to show the 
defender’s resolve to defend himself, while concealing his true offensive capacity. 
Kaufmann argues against such a strategy, pointing to the risks involved in not responding to 
an attack: 
If we back down and let the challenge go unheeded, we will suffer losses of prestige, we will decrease 
our capacity for instituting effective deterrence policies in the future, and we will encourage the 
opponent to take further actions of a detrimental character (Kaufmann, 1954, p. 7). 
 
Lebow argues that offensive action with reduced force may be counterproductive and may 
indeed solicit the exact action that the deterrent vehicle is intended to forestall. He gives 
several examples of this, one of which is the Sino-Indian conflict of Ladakh in 1960. Here, the 
Chinese withdrawal was intended to show resolve and strength, while still allowing the 
Indians to save face and back down. Instead, this led to heightened tension, since the Indians 
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interpreted the withdrawal as a Chinese fear of defeat and unresolve. (Lebow, 1985a, pp. 207-
209)  
Offensive actions in cyberspace has its proponents. Late Sen. John McCain advocated an 
offensive policy in what he called an “information war with Russia” In his book “The restless 
wave”, he suggested that America should consider cyberattacks to retaliate for Russia’s 
meddling in U.S. elections.(Gould, 2018) 
It is also significant that when Emanuel Macron, the French President launched the 
declaration “Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace”(l'Elysée, 2018),  the United 
States declined to sign(Sanger, 2018). This can be interpreted as a sign that the USA does not 
wish to relinquish its own opportunities to launch cyberattacks. 
Although most such attacks would be clandestine, some attacks could be carried out with a 
high degree of openness in order to expose the vulnerabilities of the aggressor and to display 
both to the enemy and the public the capability and resolve of the state that is defending itself.  
According to anonymous sources in the U.S administration (Hansen, 2019) U.S. cyber 
command turned off the electricity of the Russian Internet Research Agency during the 
midterm elections of 2018. This was done in response for the interference in the presidential 
election in 2016 and to pre-empt intervention during the 2018 elections.  
Another factor that favours attacks with cyber weapons is that they can be designed to reduce 
collateral damage. 
The Stuxnet worm shows how cyber weapons may reduce the risk of breaching the regulation 
on distinction. Even though the worm spread to other systems besides the Iranian nuclear 
enrichment centrifuges, there were very few systems and machines damaged outside Iran. The 
worm was constructed in a way to reduce collateral damage both by how it would only deliver 
its malware program if it found the PLCs to have the specific settings compliant with the high 
speed of the nuclear centrifuges. If these settings were not found, the program would try to 
infect other computers.  Another failsafe was the self-destruct mechanism built into the worm, 
causing it to erase itself in 2012. 
Ralph Langner said that the Stuxnet “could be considered a textbook example of a “just war” 
approach. It didn’t kill anyone”(Singer & Friedman, 2014, p. 120). 
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5.2.4. Prosecution 
In general, all cyber-attacks will be interpreted as crimes when they are investigated and 
actors will be prosecuted as criminals if they are caught. In general, this has a deterrent effect 
on individuals, but the characteristics of cyberspace has made it less formidable. A targeted 
system can be hacked from another country and there are ways to obscure where the attack 
originated, although this is becoming more difficult. Prosecution is also harder to accomplish 
if the attacker is based in a country with no extradition agreement with the attacked state. 
Attempts have been made to combat foreign state intrusion through prosecution. As shown in 
the example of the Russian intervention in the U.S presidential election of 2016, the FBI 
indicted the Internet Research Agency and thirteen of its staff.  
The possibility that these defendants will ever be present in an American court of law is 
highly unlikely. The indictment probably served two other purposes. One was to show 
Moscow that the USA was capable of reconstructing how the IRA had operated, but also that 
it had the capability of tapping the internal emails between the members of the IRA. Another 
motive was probably to show the American public the vigilance of the government and that 
the attacker were held responsible to the rule of law. 
Even though prosecution is a punitive measure, it is not an offensive one. Prosecution is 
reactive in nature, and as an instrument in international relations, it is unlikely to raise the 
level of conflict. Through the necessary investigation, the attackers and how they operate will 
be exposed. Prosecution thus serves as a defensive measure against cyber-attacks, through the 
punishment of individuals, by embarrassing the attacking state by publicity and a legal ground 
for international sanctions. 
5.2.5. International sanctions 
Should a cyber-attack be interpreted as a breach of the peace and thereby come under the 
jurisdiction of the United Nations, the Security Council may take action to restore 
international peace and security. Article 41 in the Charter includes “complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”  
Dependent upon the economic power of the victim state, economic sanctions can be severe for 
a country, but it will rarely be coercive. Lebow has argued that although the U.S. oil embargo 
on Japan in 1941 was meant to curb the country’s aggressive politics, and indeed was severe 
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on the country, the embargo instead proved to be a catalyst to the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
(Lebow, 1985a, pp. 221,222) 
In spite of the sanctions, economic and otherwise, that have been put in motion, neither 
Russia nor China, have refrained from constantly launching cyber-attacks against the U.S. or 
the West in general, which supports Lebow’s argument. The economic sanctions imposed on 
Russia from 2014 and onwards may even have increased Russia’s efforts to disrupt the West 
through subversive activities in several sectors including cyberspace.  
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6.Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis has been to examine how cyberattacks can be deterred. Based on the 
foregoing research, the conclusion presents its findings on the three research questions. The 
thesis points to possible solutions to deter hostile actions in cyberspace and suggests further 
research.   
6.1. Cyberattacks and the threat to states 
Cyberattacks share some common characteristics. They attack through computer systems on 
order to deliver their payload. Their speed gives a defender very little time to mitigate damage 
once a system has been breached. Following the intrusion, a cyber-attack will in general 
exploit a vulnerability inherent in the targeted system. Following the exploit, the intruder will 
gain control to steal, sabotage or subvert.  
The four examples that were introduced in chapter 3 represent four main vectors where a state 
can be attacked. Three of these attacks were launched with the intent of damaging a state or 
reducing its influence, while all four shared the capability to strike a state’s vital national 
interests. None of the attacks were violent in themselves, but were able to inflict damage by 
exploiting vulnerabilities in the systems. To what degree do cyberattacks threaten a state? 
A cyber weapon can be used in two separate situation. It can be used in an armed conflict, but 
due to its non- violent character, it will be used in conjunction with physical attacks. This 
means that only the threat of massive punishment will be able to stop it. In peace, cyber 
weapons will threaten a state, but only up to the point where the cyber-attack can give the 
defending state reason to retaliate with physical force. 
The statement, that once a cyber weapon has been used, its usefulness ceases, is not only a 
description of the usefulness of the weapon. It also denotes the process that will be started by 
the attacked state to reduce the perceived vulnerability and improve its proficiency. As 
discussed by Barzashka,  the Stuxnet attack at the Natanz nuclear facility, may even have 
improved the Iranian efforts of enriching uranium, as they were able to enrich it to 3,5% 
before the attack in 2007 and were able to enrich it to 20% in 2010. “Uranium-enrichment 
capacity grew during the time that Stuxnet was said to have been destroying Iranian 
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centrifuges” (Barzashka, 2013). It is evident that repeated attacks will hone the skills, 
improve the infrastructure and the organization of the defenders. 
 
6.2. Deterrence of cyber-attacks vs deterrence of 
physical attacks 
Is deterrence of cyberattacks different from deterrence of armed attacks? 
Cyber-attacks are difficult to fit into the LOAC. As has been shown, both the severity, non-
lethality and difficulty of attributing a cyber-attack are problematic. This restricts lawful 
response, particularly in peacetime. So far, research shows that cyber-attacks do not replace or 
reduce the need for deterrence against physical attacks. In war, cyber-attacks will be 
attempted to be deterred by denial and through deterrence with physical punishment as 
described above. In peacetime, there is no one solution that will deter cyber-attacks. 
Deterrence of cyber-attacks must be approached through several measures. This is discussed 
below.  
 
6.3. Relevant vehicles of deterrence;  
strengths and weaknesses  
There is no silver bullet- solution to deterring cyberattacks. As is shown, cyber-attacks will 
most likely be kept under the threshold that would give a state a reason to retaliate with 
physical force. There are several important components that can serve as vehicles of 
deterrence. 
 
Dissuasion through international agreements is an important segment of deterrence, but it 
only works if the collective punishment from the world community is more important than the 
security that can be gained from an attack. Although states may choose to adhere to such 
agreements, there are many examples where signatory states have acted in violation of the 
LOAC when vital, national interests are at stake. This was the case for the gas attacks in the 
Syrian civil war and of the Russian annexation of the Crimea. Both attacks were in violation 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the LOAC. Although international law may fall 
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short in deterring attacks, international agreements on security cooperation and prosecution 
may greatly reduce the vulnerabilities of cyberspace. 
Cyberdefense is a non-aggressive policy and will not deter an aggressor when an attack is 
perceived as a favourable course of action for the aggressive state. Nonetheless, reducing the 
damage that an attacker can hope to inflict is part of the solution to combat cyber-attacks. 
Defense must be built on a resilient infrastructure, good organization, clear procedures that 
are followed and awareness of risk. Technical solutions are necessarily a vital part of 
cyberdefense. They encompass processes such as the control of gateways, firewalls, metadata 
scanning software and password control.   
Cyberdefense will provide information of the vector and origin of an attack through the 
intelligence services, but also through forensic and surveillance activities. Although this may 
not deter an attacker, if the cost/benefit ratio can be swung sufficiently in favour of the 
defender, it will reduce his hopes of success.  
Active defense has been suggested as a solution where defensive and offensive measures are 
exploited in an automated fashion. The solution suggests that “real-time detection, analysis 
and mitigation of network breaches are combined with the aggressive use of legal 
countermeasures beyond network and state territorial borders”(Jasper, 2017, pp. 18-20). 
This can be seen as a search for a technical solution to deter cyber-attacks. Automated 
processes are able to filter out known threats and stop them. This is already a part of 
cyberdefense.  
In targeted attacks (a superset of attacks that includes APT) adversaries use specifically mutated forms 
of malware that allow the same basic exploit code to be written and re-written in hundreds or even 
thousands of ways.  Same basic code every time, but these slight mutations are specifically done to 
evade detection from classic anti-virus solutions.  Once mutated sufficiently, the targeted attack can 
deliver the payload to the target with high confidence that no signature-based means of detection will 
pick it up (Rowney, 2011).   
 
Automated processes will be able to stop known threats by scanning for their signature. This 
means that the problem of intrusion and exploitation still remains. As argued by George and 
Smoke in their discussion on the Berlin crisis, a determined attacker with the resources of a 
state, will be able to design around a deterrent threat (George & Smoke, 1974). In cyberspace, 
this can be achieved by creating new malware and circumvent automated processes to steal, 
destroy or subvert. 
Offensive action is another way to deter cyberattacks. 
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It has been argued that Russia’s activities in cyberspace is a way to counter the West’s 
superior physical force and influence on the so-called “colour-revolutions”. 
(Etterretningstjenesten, 2019a) From a defensive realistic viewpoint, Russia can be interpreted 
as trying “to maintain its position in the system”, (Waltz, 2010) using cyberspace as a field 
where it is “free to strike at any point along the whole line of defense, and in full 
force.”(Clausevitz, 1993, p. 431)  
This does not imply that it is only the West that is vulnerable in cyberspace. Pigman points 
this out, stating that “Russian political elites view cyberspace as the source of significant 
threats to Russia’s own national security; against regime security, … public safety, … 
societal norms and cohesion”(Pigman, 2019b). This is significant in that it shows that the 
Russian regime sees itself as vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Can offensive action following these 
vectors prove effective?  
Political control of the Western populace is lax. The Russian inroad to influencing the West 
has been through the exploitation of the freedom of speech and social media. Compared to the 
situation in Russia or China. Subversive attacks on regimes like Russia or China may indeed 
prove more effective than such attacks are in the West. 
Pre-emptive strikes may produce results in the short run, but it is doubtful they will make an 
enemy change his policy. Following the Bush doctrine, such attempts have been made in the 
war on terrorism, and still terrorism has not disappeared. The alleged hacking of the 
electricity of the St. Petersburg Internet Research Agency in 2018 may have been an attempt 
to pre-empt Russian attempts to interfere with the midterm elections to the U.S. Congress. 
Anonymous sources in the U.S. administration acknowledged that it was no more than the 
sting of a fly, but was valuable in proving that the USA could use the same kinds of attacks 
(Hansen, 2019)  
In themselves, offensive measures of retaliation or pre-emption are either likely to prove too 
weak to deter future attacks, or too strong, risking an escalation to an armed conflict.  
As long as the attacks in cyberspace fall short of providing legal grounds for an armed 
response, deterrence by offensive measures is unlikely to prove effective on its own.  
A deterrent vehicle that may prove potent in deterring cyber-attacks is publicity. 
After two U.S. election cycles dominated by talk of the cyber threat from Russia, many Americans see 
their democracy as deeply vulnerable to influence operations on social networks, as well as penetration 
of election infrastructure. With no satisfactory safeguard against foreign interference in place and the 
2020 presidential election cycle fast approaching, these concerns are likely to persist”(Pigman, 2019a). 
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Secrecy is one of the reasons to why attacks in cyberspace can continue to flourish. 
Awareness of the problem is vital, both in the government and in the private sector. This is 
especially important when subversive operations are carried out using the freedom of speech 
as a shield13.  
Raising the general awareness of cyberattacks, can be accomplished through education. This 
is a long process, but can be effective in curtailing an attacker’s chances of success. 
Publicity is another important factor to subdue the desirability of attacking, since “an 
incipient aggressor may be inhibited by his own conscience, or more likely, by the prospect of 
losing moral standing, and hence political standing, with uncommited countries” (Snyder, 
1961, p. 10). 
The indictment of the thirteen members of the Internet Research Agency and the conviction of 
Maria Butina (Heggen, 2019) in connection with the American presidential election 2016, the 
public denunciation of the Russian attempt at hacking into the computer system of the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the Hague 14 and the worldwide 
publicity in the aftermath of the Skripal gas attack in Salisbury, represent ways of how this 
can be achieved.  Considering these targets, Russia can be seen as seeking to bolster its 
political standing. “Embarrassed by … truth, Russia fought back by retaliating against the truth 
tellers and against the truth itself”(Demers, 2018). 
Publicity and free speech is also the Achilles’ heel of authoritative states, sensitive as they are to public 
opinion. Letting the sun in by means of education, awareness and publicity are vital elements 
to curb the mass of state-sponsored cyber-attacks and make the trolls burst. 
                                                 
13 E.g. Russia Today, which transmits in Arab, French, English, German, Spanish and has launched subsidiaries 
outside Russia, notably in France, where the channel has sided with “les vestes jaunes”(Torvik, 2019). 
14 In 2018, four GRU operatives were caught trying to hack into the computer network of the Organisation for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Plans for their next target, a laboratory in Switzerland were 
found among the agents’ possessions. The OPCW and its laboratory were responsible for the investigation and 
forensic work following the Skripal nerve agent attack (2018) and the gas attacks in Syria. “… the evince…, the 
overarching Russian strategic goal: to pursue its interests through illegal influence and disinformation 
operations aimed at muddying or altering perceptions of the truth.” (Demers, 2018) 
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6.4. Deterrence - A long haul15 
Cyberspace resembles the Wild West in the sense that it is a place where vast areas are left 
without any authority capable of upholding the law. Will the anarchy and lack of legislation 
continue to remain the situation in cyberspace?  
In 1953, President Eisenhower did not see the deterrence of Soviet Russia as a quick-fix. In 
his eyes “The USSR will continue to rely heavily on tactics of division and subversion to 
weaken the free world… exploit differences among members of the free world… to manipulate 
opinion and control governments wherever possible” (162/1, 1953). 
In order to counter the constant threat from the USSR, the NSC 162/1 prescribed in addition 
to military forces and readiness, the maintenance of a strong economy, the maintenance of 
morale and the operation of free institutions, expand scientific training and provide for an 
appropriate distribution of services in the event of national emergency.  
The seesaw competition of offense and defense may be slowly turning direction. As has been 
shown, legislation is slowly curbing the free- roaming days of social media. International 
discussions are held on how to curb attacks in cyberspace. States have intensified their efforts 
to prevent successful attacks by improving their defensive cyber architecture and become 
more resilient to attacks. On the other hand, we may have seen some attempts that retaliation 
has been carried out. Should the offense keep the supremacy over defense in cyberspace these 
attempts can evolve into deterrence by punishment.  
In the end, law and order came to the West. Subjected to state jurisdiction, the Wild West 
ceased to be. With growing international cooperation, setting standards for the safeguarding 
of network traffic, technical solutions, prosecution and punishment of attackers, each 
country’s cyberdefense can become far more effective. Through publicity and awareness, it 
will become harder for malefactors to influence the public.  
It will probably be the concerted efforts of international cooperation, stricter regulation of 
social media, improved national security, education and awareness and finally the threat of 
retaliation that will deter attackers, mitigate the consequences of attacks and safeguard free 
                                                 
15 The quote signified Dwight D. Eisenhower’s vision for defense planning to ensure constant readiness and 
vigilance  
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elections, free speech and safe infrastructure. Such processes take time, but there are signs 
that the days of Wild West of cyberspace are coming to an end. 
6.5. Further research 
Cyberspace is still in development, which means that there will be new vulnerabilities to 
exploit and new ways to exploit them. The emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT), cloud 
computing and the worry among Western democracies of allowing Chinese companies to 
deliver 5G networks, are all signs that the vulnerabilities and attacks in cyberspace may be 
with us for years to come.  
International cooperation to stop cyberattacks is probably a key to reduce their virulence. 
There is cooperation between security firms and different government bodies to share 
information on discovered threats and how they can be neutralized. Nonetheless, we see 
companies and states can be successfully attacked by the same malware after it has been 
discovered and the solution to stop it has been divulged. The example of Hydro is a case in 
point. The same virus attacked Altran on January 24th and Hydro was not hit until the 15th of 
March. What are the obstacles to rapid publication of new threats and implementation of 
countermeasures? 
Zero- day exploits are among the favourite weaknesses exploited in cyber-attacks. The black 
market ecosystem of cyberspace is an important part of the threats in cyberspace. It is here 
that “zero-day”- exploits have been sold off to the highest bidder, and where states are 
suspected to be potential buyers.(Ablon, Libicki, & Golay, 2014, pp. 25-28) Some companies 
have offered bounties to persuade hackers sell their information back to them in order to stop 
the vulnerability and improve their products. This has the potential of turning criminal 
hackers into legitimate actors. International cooperation may also have an impact through 
investigation and prosecution. What means are effective to reduce the malignant spreading of 
zero-day exploits?  The black market of cyberspace and how it can be curbed is a field that 
warrants more research. 
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In his book, “The soul of Battle”, Victor Davis Hanson writes about how the three generals 
Epaminondas16, Sherman17 and Patton18 fought against and vanquished tyranny. One of 
Hanson’s main points in this book is that their armies were democratic, and that it was the 
democratic spirit that was pivotal to these victories. Their tyrannical enemies had an 
“Achilles’ heel” in that they suppressed their population19.(Hanson, 1999)  
 As has been shown earlier, authoritarian states today have the same disadvantage in that they 
need to control their own population. This vulnerability is recognised by authoritarian regimes 
and the West has been accused of manipulating popular sentiment (Pigman, 2019a). This 
attack vector has not been exploited in any known attacks, but could become a powerful 
deterrent measure against such adversaries. Influence cyber operations against authoritative 
states, their effects and their influence on international relations is a topic for further research. 
  
                                                 
16 Theban general who defeated the Spartan empire in the fourth century BCE. 
17 American general, who played a major part with his “army of the West” in defeating the Confederacy (1860-
1865) 
18 American general. Led the US Seventh Army in the Mediterranean theatre and the U.S. Third Army through 
France and Germany during WW2.  
19 Sparta suppressed the Helots, The Confederacy was a slave economy and the Third Reich had occupied most 
of Europe. 
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7.Appendix A Advanced Persistant Threats 
APT Name Origin Targeted sectors 
APT1 
 
Unit 61398, Comment 
Crew 
China’s People’s 
Liberation Army 
(PLA) General 
Staff Department’s 
(GSD) 3rd 
Department 
IT, defense, aerospace, science, space, high tech, 
international organizations 
APT3 UPS Team China Aerospace, Defense, Constructio, Engineering, High 
Tech, Telecommunications,Transportation 
APT5  unknown Asia-Based Telecommunications, and Tech Firms, High-
Tech Manufacturing, Military Application Technology 
and satelite communication 
APT10 Menupass Team China Construction, engineering, aerospace, telecom, United 
States, European, and Japanese govts. 
APT12 Calc Team China Journalists, government, defense industrial base 
APT16  China Japanese and Taiwanese high-tech, government services, 
media and financial services industries 
APT17 Tailgator Team, Deputy 
Dog 
China U.S. government, and international law firms and 
information technology companies 
APT18 Wekby China Aerospace, Defense, Construction, Engineering, 
Education, Health and Biotechnology, High Tech, 
Telecommunications, Transportation 
APT19 Codoso Team China Legal and investment 
APT28 Fancy Bear/Sofacy/Tsar 
Team/Pawnstorm/Sednit/ 
CyberCaliphate/Cyber 
Berkut/Voodoo Bear/ 
Sandworm/BlackEnergy 
Actors/STRONTIUM 
Russia, GRU USA, Europe, Caucasus, NATO, EU, defense,  
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APT29 The Dukes/Cozy Bear Russia, 
FSB20/SVR21 
Western European governments, foreign policy groups 
and other similar organizations 
APT30  China Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) 
APT32 OceanLotus Group Vietnam Foreign companies investing in Vietnam’s manufacturing, 
consumer products, consulting and hospitality sectors 
APT33  Iran Aerospace, energy 
APT34  Iran financial, government, energy, chemical, and 
telecommunications 
APT37 Reaper North Korea South Korea, chemicals, electronics, manufacturing, 
aerospace, automotive, and healthcare 
APT38  North Korea Financial institutions world-wide 
 
  
                                                 
20 Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation 
21 Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation 
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8.Appendix B  
Cyberattacks connected to APT 28 (GRU) 
Attack Assessment 
Between July and August 2015 multiple email accounts 
belonging to a small UK-based TV station were accessed 
and content stolen. 
NCSC22 assess with high confidence that the GRU was 
almost certainly responsible. 
In August 2016, confidential medical files relating to a 
number of international athletes were released. WADA 
stated publicly that this data came from a hack of its 
Anti-Doping Administration and Management system. 
NCSC assess with high confidence that the GRU was 
almost certainly responsible. 
In 2016, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) was 
hacked and documents were subsequently published 
online. 
NCSC assess with high confidence that the GRU was 
almost certainly responsible. 
In October 2017, BadRabbit ransomware encrypted hard 
drives and rendered IT inoperable. This caused 
disruption including to the Kyiv metro, Odessa airport, 
Russia’s central bank and two Russian media outlets. 
NCSC assess with high confidence that the GRU was 
almost certainly responsible. 
Attack NCSC Assessment 
In June 2017 a destructive cyber attack targeted the 
Ukrainian financial, energy and government sectors but 
spread further affecting other European and Russian 
businesses. 
The UK Government attributed this attack to the GRU 
in February 2018. NCSC assess with high confidence 
that the GRU was almost certainly responsible. 
In October 2017, VPNFILTER malware infected 
thousands of home and small business routers and 
network devices worldwide. The infection potentially 
allowed attackers to control infected devices, render 
them inoperable and intercept or block network traffic. 
In April 2018, the NCSC, FBI and Department for 
Homeland Security issued a joint Technical Alert about 
this activity by Russian state-sponsored actors. 
In March 2018 the GRU attempted to compromise the 
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) computer 
systems via a spearphishing attack. 
NCSC assess with high confidence that the GRU was 
almost certainly responsible. 
In April 2018 the GRU attempted to use its cyber 
capabilities to gain access to the UK Defence and 
Science Technology Laboratory (DSTL) computer 
systems. 
NCSC assess with high confidence that the GRU 
was almost certainly responsible. 
                                                 
22 National Cyber Security Centre. The NCSC supports the most critical organisations in the UK, the wider 
public sector, industry, SMEs as well as the general public.  
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In April 2018 the GRU attempted to use its cyber 
capabilities to gain access to official OPCW23 computer 
networks. 
NCSC assess with high confidence that the GRU was 
almost certainly responsible. 
In May 2018 GRU hackers sent spearphishing emails 
which impersonated Swiss federal authorities to directly 
target OPCW employees, and thus OPCW computer 
systems. These employees were likely attending a 
forthcoming conference in Spiez. 
NCSC assess with high confidence that the GRU was 
almost certainly responsible. 
(National Cyber Security Centre, 2019) 
 
  
                                                 
23 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The OPCW is the implementing body for the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and oversees the global endeavour to permanently and verifiably eliminate 
chemical weapons. 
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